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Abstract In this article I intend to describe an issue of the
Dutch euthanasia practice that is not common knowledge.
After some general introductory descriptions, by way of
formulating a frame of reference, I shall describe the
effects of this practice on patients, physicians and families,
followed by a more philosophical reflection on the signif-
icance of these effects for the assessment of the authen-
ticity of a request and the nature of unbearable suffering,
two key concepts in the procedure towards euthanasia or
physician-assisted suicide. This article does not focus on
the arguments for or against euthanasia and the ethical
justification of physician-assisted dying. These arguments
have been described extensively in Kimsma and Van
Leeuwen (Asking to die. Inside the Dutch debate about
euthanasia, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht,
1998).
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Euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide
in The Netherlands
The Dutch practice of physician-assisted dying (PAD) has
reached a phase of integration since the early eighties of the
previous century, when the Royal Dutch Society for
the Advancement of Medicine (RDSM) came out in favor of
the possibility of PAD in 1984. Before that date, since the
seventies, a growing acceptance of this practice appeared in
various court cases of physicians being accused of crimi-
nally ending the life of a patient. Before 1998, each case of
PAD led to a criminal investigation by the police and ulti-
mately was decided at a central level in the Justice Depart-
ment, with a final decision by the Secretary of Justice. Five
cases on PAD have been decided by the highest legal
institution, the Hoge Raad, meaning High Council, leading
to a further refinement in detail of the legal norms under
which physicians could end the life of a patient without
running the risk of criminal proceedings. All of these cases
except for one ended with light and often suspended sen-
tences for technicalities or to a verdict of not guilty. The
exception, the last case, in 2004, concerned a verdict of a
lower court that was upheld, because the patient in question,
even though she suffered unbearably according to the phy-
sician and family, never had expressed a request to die.
The important fact to remember is that the focus in these
court cases never has been the ending of life as a criminal
act, as murder. Instead, the focus has been on the nature of
medical participation at the end of life, with severely ill
patients or patients with a terminal disease. From a nor-
mative angle the courts’ orientation has been on medical
science and medical practice: how physicians deal with
sick patients at the end of their life and how they assist
patients according to medical protocol and custom (Pans
2006).
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The developments in The Netherlands culminated in the
acceptance of a law, effective since April 1, 2002, named:
Review Procedures for the Termination of Life on Request
and Assisted Suicide and Amendment of the Criminal Code
and the Burial and Cremation Act. The law is a codifica-
tion of previous jurisprudence, with one addition: the
option of an advance directive with a request to end life in
case of legal incompetence.
The basis of this law, often called the Euthanasia Law,
is a distinction between interventions at the end of life that
are called ‘normal medicine’ and those that are called ‘not
normal medicine’. Death in the course of a non-treatment
decision, in the course of the alleviation of pain and suf-
fering, including palliative sedation in case of refractory
symptoms, are considered ‘normal medicine’, resulting in a
‘natural death’. Euthanasia, physician-assisted suicide and
ending of life without a request (with acronym LAWER)
are considered ‘not normal medicine’. Contrary to a gen-
eral misconception, believing that PAD is ‘legalized’ in
The Netherlands, it should be stressed that these inter-
ventions are still considered crimes. The subtle distinction
of the euthanasia law is that each case of active help in
dying may still be a crime, unless the intervention is carried
out by a physician who has to report the act and will be
evaluated on the basis of the conditions of the law. With
the exception of the LAWER group: in the case of absence
of a request criminal procedures will follow.1
The law also makes the previous central position of the
criminal prosecution somewhat peripheral. Since 2002, the
Euthanasia Review Committees (ERCs) have the final say
in matters of PAD: they decide whether a case has been
carried out with ‘due care’ or not. If not, then the case is
referred to the criminal prosecution and the medical
inspectorate, a kind of ‘medical police’.
The ‘euthanasia law’ is by its nature physician-centered:
in it the conditions are described under which a physician
who reports his act will not be prosecuted. These condi-
tions are that a physician:
1. must be convinced that it concerns a voluntary and
well considered request
2. must be convinced that it concerns unbearable and
hopeless suffering of a patient
3. has informed the patient about the medical condition
and the options
4. has concluded with the patient that there are no
reasonable alternatives for the situation of the patient
5. has consulted with at least one other physician
independent of the case, who has seen the patient
and has given his conclusions in writing with respect to
the above conditions and
6. has carried out the life ending intervention or assisted
suicide in a medically correct way
The life ending intervention must be reported to a local
medical officer and extensive forms and medical reports for
evaluation must be made available for the ERC’s.
The Dutch government has been intimately involved in
the process of accepted euthanasia. It has had the audacity
or expediency, depending on how one chooses to qualify
this choice, to organize costly national research programs
to find out ‘how Dutch people die’, in what ways, where
and by what measures and to evaluate the legal and med-
ical professional rules and regulations. About every 5 years
since 1990 these programs are carried out and allow broad
reflection on the quality of care at the end of life (1990,
1995, 2001, 2005). They also serve as checkpoints for
undesirable developments such as (the fear of) a ‘slippery
slope’ for PAD. So far, this fear has proven not to be
realistic, based on research over these 15 years (Van
Alphen et al. 2010, 263).
Procedures to evaluate euthanasia and physician-
assisted suicide
In the mean time, between 1990 and 1997, much attention
has been paid to develop and institutionalize measures to
safeguard against undesirable practices. The focus of these
safeguards is both on the period before PAD and after.
Consultations by ‘independent medical doctors’, being
unfamiliar with and not involved in the case, take place
before PAD, evaluations by the ERCs afterwards. A
pragmatic approach has been made to have a ‘medical
consultation’ before the act as opposed to a judicial one,
because of the necessity for a consultation within a time
frame of days rather than weeks. And in the second place, it
was considered to be contradictory to involve the law in
checking whether an intervention that in principle had not
taken place and was criminal in nature, should be given
‘the green light’.
From 1997 on, the RDSM, with broad financial support
of the government, has established courses for potential
professional consultants to physicians who have decided to
honor a request to help to die. Nowadays, there are pro-
fessional consultants in all regions of the RDMS, num-
bering more than 600 individuals. They are experienced
physicians, most of them are family physicians, reflecting
1 The presence of the LAWER group has been the reason for much
criticism of the Dutch end-of-life practice. It should be noted that this
subject itself, even though it is very important, is not the focus of this
paper. Clearly these cases are not in conformity with the Dutch
conditions of acceptable PAD. The main justification of the physi-
cians has been the impossibility to communicate in situations of
extreme suffering and a shortening of life of hours or days at the most.
See Pijnenborg (1995, pp. 81–88).
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the high interest of this group in PAD from early on, and
about 15% are hospital based clinicians and nursing home
physicians, the latter a medical specialty in The Netherlands.
From 1998 on, there are also five Euthanasia Review
Committees (ERCs), reflecting the number of judicial
regions in The Netherlands. These are multidisciplinary
committees, with three members: a lawyer, a physician and
an ethicist, with nominated deputies for each discipline.
These committees meet on a monthly basis to evaluate
each case of PAD that has been reported, and they must
evaluate and report back within a time period of 6 weeks.
The delegation of the evaluation afterwards to a ‘lay
committee’ has met both national and international resis-
tance. The idea behind it was to increase the rate of
reporting by including a physician, even though there was
hesitancy to delegate the evaluation of a serious potential
crime to others than the normal legal institution for pros-
ecution. The idea was to ‘put the criminal law at some
distance’, leaving the possibility of criminal procedures in
principle open.
The ERCs have now functioned for more than 10 years.
They publish annual reports to render account of their
activities and to fulfill one of the basic requirements behind
all Dutch regulations concerning euthanasia (E) and phy-
sician-assisted suicide (PAS), to make the practice trans-
parent and to take PAD out of a ‘grey area’, without the
veil of previous ignorance that still persists in medicine
other than The Netherlands, Belgium and Oregon. This veil
of ignorance does not imply in any way a low level of
public discourse: on the contrary. But nowhere has a
country other than The Netherlands made a scientifically
valid investigation concerning an overall view of the ways
in which people die, in order to discover the extent of legal
or illegal practices.
In their annual reports the ERCs describe cases that were
found to be problematic or ‘without due care’, mostly on
technical grounds, but also, and more interesting, cases
where they focus on the absolute nature of the limits of
possibilities for E and PAS under the law. This focus is by
definition on individual cases, weighing the individual facts
of a case and finding out if these specific facts lead to
conclusion of a careful procedure, or not. These decisions
have a certain guiding meaning and function as precedents
in the decisions of these multidisciplinary committees.
The essence of ‘precedents’ is formulating answers to
individual cases with a complexity that is answered on an
individual basis, but also establishing validity in confor-
mity of the law in other comparable cases. That is the
meaning of jurisprudence in law. Examples of ‘corrective’
decisions concern for example issues of adequate consul-
tations, sometimes not independent enough or the question
of (the absence of) a well defined treatment relationship of
the physician who carries out the final intervention, or the
use of pharmaceutical substances other than the officially
prescribed ones. Examples of shifts in ‘acceptable eutha-
nasia’ can be observed in cases where patients lose full
consciousness in the end and yet the life ending takes
place, because there is no uncertainty or hesitance about
the nature of unbearable suffering or the desire of the
patient. Another example, one that is certain to cause much
reaction, concerns the acceptance of PAD in cases of ‘early
Alzheimer’s’, where after unusually long drawn out pro-
cedures the request of a patient has been accepted as
coming from a competent person, while the unbearable
nature of the suffering is also established without doubt for
the involved physicians.2
Over all these years, from 1998 through 2008, 38 cases
have been deemed to be ‘without due care’. Testifying to
the scrutiny of the committees and their rather rigid eval-
uations is the fact that in none of these cases the legal
authorities have seen adequate ground for criminal pro-
ceedings. So it seems, the regulations and procedures work
well. The present conservative government has opted to
maintain the existing procedures and resist any attempt
to extend E and/or PAS to other groups of patients or to
elderly without a disease but with a request to end life, the
so-called people who ‘suffer from life’, having lost the
desire to live on.
The effects of this practice on physicians, patients
and families
Only in countries where a practice of euthanasia and/or
PAS is allowed, is open and transparent research with a
claim of validity is possible.
In the past and current debates on euthanasia one type of
argument focuses on the negative effects of such a practice
on families, care givers and society, the so-called conse-
quentialist arguments, with a focus on the negative effects
for patients, families and physicians. In the first pilot study
on the effects of PAD on families in 1990, Carlucci-Cies-
ielski and I discovered in families we interviewed an
extremely positive feeling about the active end of life of a
2 The ‘extension’ of acceptable euthanasia to ‘early Alzheimer’s
patients’, as reflected in the Annual Reports of the ERCs, undoubtedly
will be judged by some as a sure sign of ‘the slippery slope’.
However, this extension can be seen also as a correct and nuanced
interpretation of the legal conditions in particular individual cases
after a long process of evaluation by geriatricians and psychiatrists.
Denying PAD in these circumstances with that particular diagnosis of
early Alzheimer’s, with competence, might be seen as unlawful
discrimination. It should be clear that this paper does not address the
issue of life-ending of severely deformed newborns: under Dutch law
that intervention cannot be seen as euthanasia, because euthanasia is
by definition the ending of life after a request of a competent person.
Newborns are not competent and do not request an end to life.
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family member (Ciesielski and Kimsma 1994). There was
one exception. In a family where a young father died
through PAD, the mother excluded the young children
from the process of decisions leading up to the interven-
tion. Not only the physician had doubts about the propriety
of that ‘silence’, but the spouse felt that this ‘secret in the
family’ made the acceptance of this death more difficult.
This example did not constitute an argument against the
euthanasia in itself, but was more of an argument against a
lack of transparency and openness in the various steps.3
The small number of the families we interviewed in the
pilot project was not representative and made it difficult to
generalize the conclusions of an overall very satisfying
intervention, with grief but also feelings of being content
that further suffering had been spared. In a larger retro-
spective project Swarte et al. (2003, p. 189) compared grief
in two groups of next of kin of women who died of a
gynecological cancer in the period of 1992 through 1997 in
the Academic Center of the Utrecht University. The various
‘instruments’ they used to assess the stages and intensity of
grieving showed significantly less grief in the group of
PAD. Even though the editors of BMJ choose a caption
reading ‘Bereaved people cope better after euthanasia than
natural death’, the authors are extremely careful and refrain
from that conclusion. But they point out that E and PAS
make it possible to come to terms with the death of someone
because of the possibility of ‘anticipatory grief’ and an
opportunity to discuss impending death freely and exten-
sively in an open atmosphere with the patient that will die.
Euthanasia hurts
There has also been research on the effects of PAD on
physicians, and to a lesser extent on what it means for other
care givers such as nurses and families. The first pilot
interviews were by Thomasma, Kushner and Kimsma, in
1994, published in ‘Asking to Die. Inside the Dutch Debate
about Euthanasia’ (1998) (Thomasma et al. 1998). These
interviews, with oncologists, family physicians and one
nursing home physician, started with a leading question to
speak about the ‘worst’ case of euthanasia a`nd the most
memorable in a positive sense. They showed a surprising
emotional response to any request. The range of emotions
varied from extreme shock to anxieties, leading to sleep-
lessness and deep struggles to come to a final conclusion,
but also deep satisfaction after the act. Again, the small
number of interviews could not lead to generally valid
conclusions, but these did show up in the larger represen-
tative sample of personal interviews with 405 physicians,
as part of the second national research into medical deci-
sions at the end of life from 1995/1996 (Haverkate et al.
2001, 519). These and other interviews affirmed the emo-
tional involvement after a request (Van Marwijk et al.
2007, pp. 609–614). They showed the same range of
emotions, but with some curious apparent contradictions.
Physicians showed both feelings of comfort afterwards and
feelings of discomfort. However, physicians who partici-
pated in euthanasia, after a request and with an assessment
of unbearable suffering, showed more ‘negative’ emotions
in comparison with physicians who had ended the life of
patient without a request, the group of so-called ‘life
ending without an explicit request’ (LAWER). The
majority of this latter patient group suffered because of a
serious incurable disease and were not able to communi-
cate. So it appeared that following a procedure that for-
mally is illegal, early on and still now, the emotional
experiences were less problematic than acting within the
procedural conditions of a law. But even though the phy-
sicians who had performed euthanasia seemed to suffer
more, 95% declared to be willing to perform that act in
similar situations; 5% had doubts, ‘but none had regrets’.
At that time the authors of the article were surprised at
this difference in effects between the ‘euthanasia group’
and the LAWER group, but these unexpected data were not
a reason for deeper reflection: ‘It is striking that ending a
patient’s life without an explicit request later evoked
feelings of discomfort (burdensome, emotional or a heavy
responsibility) less frequently than did performing eutha-
nasia or assisted suicide.’
We believe that this difference between expectation and
outcome calls for further analysis and explanation. We are
convinced that this difference in emotional reaction
towards a request for euthanasia is essential for under-
standing what a request means in medical and psycholog-
ical terms. Our thesis and conclusion is that deeper
emotional reactions reflect a different relationship in cases
of E and PAS in comparison with the doctor-patient rela-
tionship of LAWER, but also in comparison to normal
care, even with patients with a terminal disease.
3 One of the reviewers pointed out a presumed comparability
between the dangers of sex in the physician-patient relationship and
the risks of euthanasia. Both issues, it is claimed, are based on a
seduction that may promote behavior beyond the ethos of medicine.
The drive for sex is controlled by Eros and the other, to help people
die, by Thanatos, expressed as ‘a drive to rid themselves (e.g. the
physicians, GKK) of ‘difficult’ and undesired patients.’ See Barilan
(2003, pp. 460–463). In my view, this connection between sex and
euthanasia, as euthanasia is practiced in The Netherlands, may not be
entirely theoretical, but has no validity. The practice of euthanasia is
open, transparent and evaluated, before and after the intervention.
Patients are the prime movers of the process and each next step is
initiated by patients, not by physicians. Cost concerns have no place,
since patients are entitled to all possible palliative care. The motives
behind claims of this nature are all based on anxieties and fears of
‘slippery slopes’ and a lack of trust in the medical profession. The
Dutch democracy has chosen a different path.
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Requesting euthanasia and the physician–patient
relationship
Physicians in The Netherlands are confronted with requests
to help to die on the average 2 or 3 times a year. There are
about ten times more requests than actual cases, because
many people ask these questions just to come to some
assurance of this option in the future. Requests for the near
future from sick people are about 3 times more often than
actual requests to be helped in a short while. Reasons for
physicians to refuse in two out of three cases are: the
presence of alternative treatments, the level of suffering,
the lack of depth in a request, an incorrect assessment of
the seriousness of a disease by the patient, the unilateral
withdrawal of a request or: ‘objections in a particular case
or in general against PAD of a physician’. Each item in
itself is a reason for further analysis. However, what these
refusals have in common and what remains hidden in the
sequential description of these reasons is the fact that each
request starts a process of deliberation that has special
qualities as compared to the interactions in the usual phy-
sician-patient relationship. That process of deliberation, the
euthanasia discourse, has been the focus of research by
American anthropologist Frances Norwood (Norwood
2009). She observed and participated in the work of 10
family physicians in Amsterdam, followed and interviewed
their terminal patients. She concluded that a request for
euthanasia changes not only the doctor–patient relation-
ship, but also the relationships between patients and their
families and friends. This change is a deepening and
strengthening of the emotional commitments and relations.
The basis of this change in the physician–patient relation-
ship lies in the commitment that a request implies: the
possibility to have to end the life of a patient when suf-
fering becomes unbearable and the patient persists in
wishing to die. This commitment, with all respect, goes
beyond the commitments of usual or normal care at the end
of life. In fact, all aspects of usual care including palliative
measures are implied, but there are additional aspects.
Requests and conflicts
Being confronted with a request to end life creates conflicts
for physicians and all others who are involved. Ending life
is an inherently immoral intervention, a crime in all soci-
eties. As Buchanan states forcefully: ‘if anything is wrong,
that is wrong’ (Buchanan 1996).
This conflict has at least two sources: a psychological
and an ethical-philosophical source. The psychological
conflict concerns a confrontation with mortality in a way
that escapes the usual professional resistance to fears and
anxieties when patients appear to have a terminal disease.
Patients and physicians both live in a culture of denial of
death and medical technology is the instrument par
excellence to realize that denial. But even though,
according to Freud, there can be a rational acceptance of
death, ‘the unconscious’ promotes behavior that clings to
the idea of immortality (Freud 1957). Physicians have
learned to counter emotions with professional distance and
objectivity in order to be able to help patients accommo-
date to the realities of impending death. However, the
appearance of fears, anxieties and sleeplessness after a
request is testimony of the insufficiency of this professional
self protection in this particular situation. Objectivity and
professional distance are under a greater strain than in
‘normal medicine’ with terminal patients. Stein describes
these processes of care in terms of continuous transference
and counter transference, interactions that are not limited to
psychoanalysis only. Caring implies a continuous identifi-
cation with one’s own motives as a care giver and the
motives and desires of patients (Stein 1985, p. 21).
This process is largely unconscious and a physician’s
attitude can be seen as a mix of personal anxieties for
death, motives for becoming a physician, personal and
professional experiences with death and dying and the
ethos of modern medicine. That attitude usually provides
sufficient protection in caring for the dying. In general
caring for terminal patients often implies a closeness and
high level of emotional involvement and compassion.
However, patients requesting help in ending their life break
these barriers to anxieties down and force physicians to
identify with their patients’ suffering over the borders of
their anxieties. In order to be able to help a patient die they
need to become convinced in a rational way that the
authentic answer to that suffering is an active ending of
life. This implies a need to come closer to the patient who
has expressed that request.
The necessity to come to a conclusion that the suffering
of this particular patient indeed has become unbearable as a
joint conclusion between physician and patient implies
intimate knowledge of the patient as a person and a human
being with a biography. This joint activity is keenly dis-
tinguished in the Dutch Euthanasia Law where it is stipu-
lated that physician and patient together have come to a
conclusion that, for euthanasia to be allowed, there is no
other reasonable solution available. Suffering has many
sides, but in essence two philosophical approaches can be
distinguished: the empirical side of suffering and the her-
meneutic side. Unbearable suffering does not only concern
the empirical, physical symptoms or complaints and the
loss of functions and independence. Essential for the
evaluation is the hermeneutic aspect: what these symptoms
and loss of functions mean to a patient as personal eval-
uations of that patient. In order to be able to perform that
function a physician must know about the patient as a
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person, the patient’s biography and the patient’s context
and balance of endurance and tolerance.
The second source of emotional conflicts for physicians
who are confronted with a request to help someone die has
philosophical and ethical roots. The principle objection
against euthanasia is that ending a person’s life goes
against the grain of a fundamental prohibition: ‘Thou shallt
not kill’. In most civilized societies even the execution of
killers is now prohibited, in conformity with this rule. In
our culture, Christianity has been forced to reflect intensely
on the feasibility of the absolute nature of this principle.
The absolute interpretation conflicted with the desire to
become the religion of the state, after Constantine the
Great’s conversion to Christianity in 325 AD. In order to
become the religion of the state, the Church had to accept
the killing of enemy soldiers in aggression. This option,
however, has never been open to individuals, even in case
of self defense, according to Saint Augustine (354–430).
Thomas Aquinas ended the dispute in the twelfth century
with his definition that ‘taking innocent life is immoral at
all times (Rachels 1987). Based on these convictions,
taking innocent life in medicine appears to be a paradig-
matic example of a fundamentally immoral intervention, as
many still feel today (Pellegrino et al. 1988).
Nevertheless, throughout all time and ages, there has
been a growing support among medical professionals and
lay persons to allow the option to end the life of seriously
ill people. There have been large euthanasia movements in
the USA, Great Britain and Germany since the middle of
the nineteenth century. In the ethical dilemma between
prohibition and acceptance the onus is on the arguments to
support this intervention. According to Buchanan, principle
arguments against the intervention are the denial of a
person’s well being and dignity and the violation of his
right to life. However, in case of serious illness, the disease
already has taken a patient’s wellbeing and dignity. And
secondly, a right to life implies the option not to exercise
that right any longer. That choice is entirely the individ-
ual’s choice. That is essentially the meaning of autonomy,
and from this conclusion it follows that autonomy is the
fundamental argument to justify the taking of life. This
position is reflected in Dutch jurisprudence and law:
without a request there cannot be a justified euthanasia or
physician-assistance in suicide.
However, autonomy is not the sole justification. A
request by itself is insufficient justification: it would lead to
a permissive system for which no physician has expressed
support. The second fundamental argument is found in the
experience of compassion. This experience is not an indi-
vidual’s quality but the expression of a relation. To respond
to unbearable suffering and breaking a fundamental law, is
only possible when there is a relation that makes it possi-
ble. Being able to end the life of a patient implies the
existence of a physician-patient relationship with different
qualities than in ‘normal medicine’.
It is important to realize that this relationship is reci-
procal and mutual. This reciprocity has been observed by
consultants and discussed in interviews with physicians
(Obstein et al. 2004, p. 223). One of the signs of this
mutuality is the fact that the final decision to go ahead with
E or PAS is taken after a process in which patient and
physician come to a joint shared conclusion that suffering
indeed has become unbearable and hopeless. This shared
conclusion does not come ‘spontaneously’. It is the result
of communication about medical options and how patients
experience these options in the light of the progress of the
disease, their vision about how much they ‘choose’ to
endure and the quality of life. There may be and often are
differences of opinion in the possibilities of palliative
measures. As Norwood has shown, physicians tend to wait
until patients initiate ‘the next steps in the sequence of
events leading to E and PAS. Patients sometimes need to
wait until they have convinced ‘their physician’. They do
so, out of respect. Patients very well know that what they
ask of a physician is the ultimate of what human beings can
ask each other.
Recent research with patients who request for E or PAS
has shown a difference in focus on suffering between
physicians and patients (Pasman et al. 2009). Physicians
tend to focus on physical symptoms such as pain and
chronic fatigue, patients stated that the pain did not make
their suffering unbearable, but seemed ‘mainly to consist of
non-physical suffering, such as (fear of) dependence, no
longer being able to participate in normal daily life, or
mental suffering, because of deterioration’. Physicians also
would focus on what the authors describe as ‘coherence’: a
difference in expected and actual behavior of a patient,
such as reading a book, or being able to open the front door
in order to welcome the physician. During the process of
euthanasia these differences either are leveled out or result
in a refusal to a request.
A different relationship: ‘medical friendship’
It is important to reflect on the issue whether a relationship
of that type fits customary conceptions of the doctor–
patient relationship. Clark and I reintroduced the notion of
‘medical friendship’ to describe the different relationship
in case of a euthanasia process (Clark and Kimsma 2004).
We proposed Aristotle’s notions of friendship to qualify
that type of relation (Aristotle 1999, book eight). What
Aristotle describes in the Nicomachean Ethics is friendship
based on either pleasure, utility or virtue. ‘What is key for
the physician and patient is the concept of reciprocal love
or similar virtue that makes the category of virtue
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necessary for a complete friendship. One important aspect
of this reciprocity is that no one who is a complete friend
would ask the other to do something morally base and
contrary to virtue. Doing so would demonstrate that the
relationship never was or is no longer founded on shared
virtue; it has become one of utility’ (Clark and Kimsma
2004, p. 64). The qualification of friendship for the patient–
physician relationship is not alien to medicine: Linda and
Ezekiel Emanuel have proposed a ‘deliberative model’ in
which the physician acts ‘as a teacher or friend, engaging
the patient in dialogue on what course of action would be
best’ (Emanuel and Emanuel 1999). Their description gives
maximum room for patient values, but it lacks space for the
physician’s values. What is essential to realize is that the
patient must respect what is asked of the physician as much
as the physician must come to terms with what the patient
requests, in a process of mutuality with a final interpersonal
agreement.
Concluding remarks
My intention has been to show that a request for euthanasia
or physician-assisted suicide has emotional effects on
patients, families and physicians. The focus has been on
physicians and patients with the aim to analyze why a
request evokes such emotional responses. Research attests
to the depth of what it means for a physician to end the life
of a patient. These deeper unsettling responses, however,
are reasons for deeper relationships than in daily medicine
with its focus on healing. They serve as conditions to be
able to assess the unbearable suffering of patients and in
the end to come to a joint conclusion that this suffering has
been enough.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which per-
mits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
References
Aristotle. 1999. Friendship between unequals. In Nicomachean ethics,
ed. T. Irwin, Book Eight, viii: 1159a9–60a9, 127–129. India-
napolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company.
Barilan, Y.M. 2003. Of doctor-patient sex and assisted suicide. Israel
Medical Association Journal 5(6): 460–463.
Buchanan, A. 1996. Intending death: the structure of the problem and
proposed solutions. In Intending death: The ethics of assisted
suicide and euthanasia, ed. T. Beauchamp, 23–41. Upper Saddle
River: Prentice Hall.
Ciesielski, C., and G.K. Kimsma. 1994. The impact of reporting cases
of euthanasia in Holland. Bioethics 8(2): 151–159.
Clark, C.C., and G.K. Kimsma. 2004. ‘‘Medical friendships’’ in
assisted dying. Cambridge Quarterly of Health Care Ethics 13:
61–67.
Emanuel, E., and L. Emanuel. 1999. Four models of the physician–
patient relationship. In Ethical issues in modern medicine, 5th
ed, ed. J. Arras, and J.B. Steinbock, 67–76. Mountain View, CA:
Mayfield.
Freud, S. 1957. Thoughts for the times on war and death. (II Our
attitudes towards death). In The standard edition of the complete
works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 14, ed. J. Strachey, and A. Freud,
289–300. London: Hogarth Press.
Haverkate, I., A. van der Heide, B.D. Onwuteaka-Philipsen, et al.
2001. The emotional impact on physicians of hastening the death
of a patient. MJA 175: 519–522.
Kimsma, G.K., and E. van Leeuwen. 1998. Euthanasia and assisted
suicide in The Netherlands and the USA: Comparing practices,
justifications and key concepts in bioethics and law. In Asking to
die. Inside the Dutch euthanasia debate, ed. D.C. Thomasma,
et al., 35–71. Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic
Publishers.
Norwood, F. 2009. The maintenance of life. Preventing social death
through euthanasia talk and end-of-life care—lessons from The
Netherlands, 127–155. Durham/North Carolina: Carolina Aca-
demic Press.
Obstein, K.L., G.K. Kimsma, and T. Chambers. 2004. Practicing
euthanasia: The perspective of physicians. Journal of Clinical
Ethics 15(3): 223–231.
Pans, E. 2006. De normatieve grondslagen van het Nederlandse
euthanasierecht (trans: The normative foundation of the Dutch
euthanasia (case) law). Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers.
Pasman, H.R.W., M.L. Rurup, D.L. Willems, and B.D. Onwuteaka-
Philipsen. 2009. Concept of unbearable suffering in context of
ungranted requests for euthanasia: Qualitative interviews with
patients and physicians. BMJ 339: b4362.
Pellegrino, E.D., et al. 1988. Doctors must not kill. JAMA 259:
2139–2140.
Pijnenborg, L. 1995. Life terminating acts without the patient’s
explicit request. In End-of-life decisions in Dutch medical
practice, 81–88. Dissertation, Erasmus University.
Rachels, J. 1987. The end of life. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stein, H. 1985. The psychodynamics of medical practice. Uncon-
scious factors in patient care, 21 ff. Berkeley/Los Angeles/
London: University of Chicago Press.
Swarte, N.B., M.L. van der Lee, J.G. van der Bom, et al. 2003. Effects
of euthanasia on the bereaved family and friends: A cross
sectional study. BMJ 327: 189–192.
Thomasma, D.C., T. Kimbrough-Kushner, G.K. Kimsma, and
C. Ciesielski-Carlucci (eds.). 1998. Asking to die. Inside the
Dutch euthanasia debate. Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer
Academic Press.
Van Alphen, J.E., G.A. Donker, and R.L. Marquet. 2010. Requests for
euthanasia in general practice before and after the implementa-
tion of the Dutch Euthanasia Act. British Journal of General
Practice 60(573): 263–267.
Van Marwijk, H., I. Haverkate, and A.-M. The. 2007. Impact of
euthanasia on primary care physicians in The Netherlands.
Palliative Medicine 21: 609–614.
Death by request in The Netherlands 361
123
